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1 Introduction
Different conclusions emerge from the available literature on how Employment Pro-
tection Legislation (EPL) affects total factor productivity (TFP) growth. On the one
hand, there is the view that more stringent EPL reduces TFP. For example, Hopenhayn
andRogerson (1993) andAutor et al. (2007) argue that the distortion and the lower real-
location flows induced by stringent EPL lead firms to use resources less efficiently.
Likewise, Saint-Paul (2002) shows that stricter EPL induces firms to adopt mature
technologies to improve existing products rather than to experiment with riskier pri-
mary innovations. Wasmer (2006), in turn, emphasizes that, by inducing substitution
of specific for general skills, stringent EPL hinders worker relocation across industries
in the presence of sectorial shocks. Finally, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) claim that lay-
off protection may reduce workers’ effort (a component of TFP) by inducing higher
absenteeism. On the other hand, there is an alternative strand of the literature which
argues in favour of favourable effects of stringent EPL on TFP. For instance, since
EPL raises reservation wages, Lagos (2006) argues that firms become more selective
and only realize more productive matches, while MacLeod and Navakachara (2007)
and Belot et al. (2007) claim that EPL induces firms and workers to invest more in
match-specific training, therefore improving TFP growth.
It should be noticed, however, that the setup considered in most this literature
is one where all workers get hired under the same (open-ended) labour contracts,
so that a single EPLregime is assumed to operate in the labour market. Yet, this
assumption leaves out the case of dual EPL regimes which have been prevalent in
several southern European countries, where there are substantial differences between
the dismissal regulations pertaining to workers under permanent (open-ended) and
temporary (fixed-term) contracts. As a result, the issue of how a dual EPL regime
affects TFP has received much less attention and remains an open issue (see Sect. 2
below).
Our goal here is to help fill this gap in two different ways. First, by providing some
novel theoretical underpinnings of how labour market dualism could affect technical
efficiency through two specific components of TFP, namely, workers’ effort and occu-
pational training. Second, by empirically testing the predictions of our model using
longitudinal firm-level data for Spain, which has been often considered as an epitome
of dual EPL in southern Europe.
Dualism is the Spanish labour market dates back to the mid-eighties. To fight high
unemployment, a radical “two-tier” labour reform was passed in 1984 allowing firms
to use very flexible fixed-term contracts (entailing lowor no severance pay) not only for
seasonal/replacement jobs but also for regular activities. Yet, previous stringent EPL
rules for open-ended contracts (entailing high redundancy pay) remained effectively
unchanged (see, e.g., Dolado et al. 2002 and Bentolila et al. 2008). The share of
temporary workers in dependent employment shot from 15% at the time of the reform
to 35.4% during the mid-1990s. Since then, temporary contracts have represented
more than 90% of all new contracts signed each year. Subsequently, following several
EPL reforms at the margin, a plateau of 30% was reached. More recently, despite a
massive destruction of temporary jobs during the Great Recession, and a more radical
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EPL reform approved in 2012 to fight dualism, the rate of temporary work has only
dropped to 25%, which still remains one of the highest rates among OECD countries.
On top of labour market dualism, another salient feature of the Spanish economy
is the large slowdown in labour productivity experienced during the decade preceding
the global financial crisis, when both employment and hours worked soared. This fall
in productivity growth was not due to lower capital accumulation per worker in the
aftermath of rapid employment growth, but rather to a drastic reduction in TFP growth,
from 1.5% in 1980–1994 to −0.5% in 1995–2005. Although part of this productivity
drop was due to the strong dependence of the Spanish economy on several low value-
added industries (like residential construction, tourism and personal services), there is
ample evidence documenting that TFP also performed very poorly in tradable sectors,
including manufacturing (see e.g., Escribá and Murgui 2009, and Garcia-Santana
et al. 2015). This negative outcome at a time where the use of IT technologies was
very intense worldwide contrasts sharply not only with TFP growth in the US, which
accelerated since the 1990s, but also with the rest of the EU-15, where the productivity
slowdown was less acute than in Spain.1 As Jimeno and Santos (2014) have argued in
their narrative of the crisis in the Spanish economy, the increasing bias in its sectorial
composition towards labour-intensive and low- productive industries has been due to
two intertwined channels: (i) a labour market regulation which favoured the intensive
use of temporary contracts, and (ii) a banking system capable of feeding the huge
increase in credit demand by consumers and firms through recourse to external funding
and lax facilities for the use of real assets a loan collateral in a context of very low real
interest rates.
In view of these considerations, our focus here is on issues related to channel (i)
above. In particular, we analyze how exogenous variations in the large differential
between the firing costs of permanent and temporary workers (dubbed the firing-
costs or EPL gap hereafter) impinges on TFP growth through changes in the relative
job performance and on-the-job training of these two types of workers. The specific
mechanismwe highlight here is onewhere regulatory changes in the EPLgap influence
firms’ decisions to upgrade contracts from temporary to permanent status (in short,
temp-to-perm conversion rate). These decisions, in turn, affect bothworkers’ incentives
to exert effort and the amount of paid-for training that firms invest on their employees.
To the extent that effort and training are relevant unobserved components of TFP, this
channel may have played a relevant role in linking changes in dual EPL and firms’
productivity.
Tomake this argument transparent, we propose a stylized model of how employers’
andworkers’ decisions interact in a prototypical dual labourmarket, akin to theSpanish
one. Our setup is one where firms find optimal to open jobs under fixed-term contracts
which last for one period and cannot be renewedwith the sameworker in sequence.2 At
their termination, the employer faces the decision to dismiss theworker (paying a small
1 According to EU KLEMS, a harmonized dataset for multifactor productivity in EU countries, labour
productivity and TFP growth in EU-15 fell from 2.7% in 1970–1994 to 1.3% in 1995–2005, whereas the
corresponding figures for Spain are 0.7 and 0.3%, respectively (see Escribá and Murgui 2009).
2 As documented in Sect. 4, we ignore direct hirings of workers under permanent contracts because they
have represented less than 5% of all annual hirings during the sample period.
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severance compensation for contract termination) or to upgrade her temporary contract
into a permanent one (subject to much higher severance pay). Temporary workers
supply effort by trading off its disutility against a combination of a higher wage and
promotion prospects. Firms bargain wages with these workers and design contracts
(in terms of conversion rates and paid-for-training provision) to elicit that level of
non-contractible effort that maximizes their expected profits, subject to participation
and incentive compatibility constraints.
Insofar as severance pay cannot be fully neutralized in the wage bargaining (see
Lazear 1990), our main theoretical prediction is that, unless permanent workers
respond to a high EPL gap by exerting much more effort (thus making their jobs
much more attractive for firms and temporary workers), a rise in the EPL gap is likely
to reduce firms’ temp-to-perm conversion rates. The basic insight is as follows: absent
a large increase in effort by permanent workers, a higher EPL gap reduces the prof-
itability of permanent jobs, decreasing firms’ conversion rates and their provision of
paid-for-training for temporary workers since their job tenures are short. As a result,
the latter opt for lower effort which, ceteris paribus, hinders firm productivity. Con-
versely, reductions of the EPL gap would lead to opposite results.
To corroborate this intuition, we use longitudinal firm-level data from the Survey on
Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE) which offers
detailed annual information on a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing
firms over the period 1991–2005. Although ESEE lacks information on workers’
effort and paid-for training, a unique feature of this dataset is that it provides all
the key variables required to compute TFP and temp-to-perm conversion rates for
each firm level in each year of the sample. This allows us not only to use TFP as
a composite embedding unobserved worker’s effort and training, but also to have a
precise measure of the other key variable in the mechanism explored here. Further,
ESEE includes information on other relevant variables which could affect TFP, such as
R&D expenditure and the proportions of public and foreign capital. Since it reasonable
to assume that these variables affect TFP in a more sluggish way than effort and
training, they are used as predetermined covariates in the empirical exercise, isolating
in this way the relationship between conversion rates and the two specific components
of TFP we focus on here.
Using TFP as a composite of the two outcome variables of interest raises the issue
of how to disentangle the responses of temporary and permanent workers’ perfor-
mance to changes in the EPL gap. Our identifying strategy relies upon testing the
above-mentioned mechanism separately for firms with very high and very low rates of
temporary work. We expect the decisions concerning temporary workers to be much
more prevalent in the first group of firms. Our main finding is that the response of
permanent workers to changes in the EPL gap has been rather minor in comparison
to the response of temporary workers. This could be due to two specific features of
the two-tier EPL reforms in Spain that we analyze in the empirical section. The first
one is that none of these reforms changed the EPL rights of permanent workers in a
retroactive fashion (i.e., legal changes applied exclusively to newworkers) while those
affecting the EPL of temporary workers had immediate effects on them (see Dolado
et al. 2002). The second one is that the share of newly hired permanent workers after
the reforms was fairly small (less than 5% per year) and evolved very slowly over
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Fig. 1 Weighted averages of conversion rates and firms’ TFP growth rates (ESEE, 1992–2005)
time. Fragmentary evidence supporting this finding is also provided using data from
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) which, unlike ESEE allows us to
examine differences in training practices between permanent and temporary workers.
Some suggestive motivation for our empirical approach is provided in Fig. 1 where
the (employment weighted) annual averages of the temp-to-perm conversion rates
(left axis) and TFP growth rates (right axis) are jointly displayed for our sample of
manufacturing firms.3 As can be inspected, both variables exhibit strikingly similar
patterns over the sample period, including a common declining trend from the late
1990s to the mid-2000s.
In view of this preliminary evidence, we evaluate the impact of changes in the
firing-cost gap on firms’ TFP using three dual EPL reforms that took place during
the sample period. Since these were nationwide reforms, variation of their effects
across firms is obtained by assuming that those firms (or industries) with a higher
share of temporary workers prior to the implementation of the reforms were more
strongly affected than other firms with lower shares of temporary work. Indeed, we
show that, in those instances when the EPL gap went down (up), conversion rates
and TFP move up (down) together much more closely in firms with high shares of
temporaryworkers than in those firmswith lower shares. Hence, we take this empirical
finding as supportive of our main prediction.
However, on its own, this direct mechanism cannot explain the collapse in TFP
growth and in conversion rates from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. This is so
since the only reform raising the firing-costs gap during this period took place in
2002, i.e. in the middle of that period. We present some additional empirical evidence
indicating that the declining patterns in both variables could be related to the expansion
of ancillary industries (with high rates of temporary work) to the real estate sector,
where a bubble started to grow at the turn of the century. Insofar this specialization
3 As explained in Sect. 4, TFP has been computed using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation approach
of production functions at the firm level.
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pattern into low-TFP industries responds to the possibility of using flexible fixed-term
contracts in an otherwise rigid labour market, we conjecture that this channel may
have provided an indirect detrimental effect of dualism on productivity growth.
Using Hsieh and Klenow’s 2009 well-known methodology, Garcia-Santana et al.
(2015) have recently argued that the poor productivity performance of the Spanish
economy between 1995 and 2007 was due to a pervasive misallocation of resources
across all sectors. This was especially relevant in those industries more prone to crony-
ism (e.g., construction and real estate), where the role of connections with public
officials is key for business success. Admittedly, our approach abstracts from this
channel and instead focuses on the impact of changes in dual EPL on average TFP
growth through the mechanism described before. Incorporating their effects on the
allocation of resources across firms remains an open issue to be more deeply analyzed
in future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the
related literature. Section 3 lays out a model of the relevant decisions taken by workers
and firms in a dual labour market, and draws relevant predictions for the subsequent
empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the EESE dataset and provides descriptive sta-
tistics on the main variables in our mechanism. Section 5 presents empirical evidence
about the impact of three dual EPL reforms on firms’ TFP, via its effects on conver-
sion rates, as well as some scant evidence based on a different dataset about its effect
on training . Finally, Sect. 6 concludes. An Appendix with three parts contains some
algebraic derivations and more detailed definitions of the variables.
2 Related literature
Our paper relates to a small literature dealing with the impact of dual EPL on labour
market outcomes, which has mainly focused on its effects on unemployment and
labour turnover.4
There is a strand of the literature analyzing the effects of changes in a (single) EPL
regime on (labour) productivity, but from a different angle than ours. For example,
Autor et al. (2007) and Bassanini et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence showing
that strict EPL has a depressing impact on productivity in the US and the EU. It does
so because it reduces the level of risk that firms are ready to endure in experimenting
with new technologies. In a similar vein, Cingano et al. (2010) use an Italian EPL
reform in 1990, where firing costs in small firms were increased, to analyze the effects
of changes in EPL on a variety of labour market outcomes, including firms’ TFP. Yet,
none of these studies considers a dual EPL system affecting workers, as we do here.
They focus instead on assessing the impact of overall EPL changes on productivity by
testing for significant differences in the outcomes of a treatment group (e.g., smaller
firms in Italy or US states adopting wrongful discharge protections) and a control
group (e.g., larger firms in Italy or US states not adopting those rules).
4 See, inter alia, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Dolado et al. (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and
Bentolila et al. (2012).
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Our focus here also differs from a smaller strand of this literature which does
consider dual EPL in relation to productivity. For example, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007)
analyze the Italian two-tier labour market and find evidence of a negative relationship
between the share of temporary work and labour productivity growth. They interpret
this result in terms of a transitory increase in labour demand induced by the higher
flexibility of temporary jobs (i.e., the so-called “honeymoon” effect of this type of
reforms) which leads firms to increasingly hire less productive workers through these
flexible contracts. Likewise, Sánchez and Toharia (2000) estimate the reduced form
of a standard efficiency-wage model using the same Spanish database we use here,
albeit for a much shorter period (1991–1994), and also find a negative relationship
between temporary work and labour productivity. Similar but more updated results
have been reported by Alonso-Borrego (2010) using the Firms’ Balance Sheets of the
Bank of Spain. More recently, using variation across sectors and over time, Cappellari
et al. (2012) have evaluated the effects on a variety of outcomes of an Italian reform
in 2001 which relieved employers from justifying the use of temporary workers in
the employment contract. Yet, despite sharing a similar empirical approach to ours,
none of these papers explore the specific mechanism linking changes in the EPL gap
to conversion rates and TFP growth that we stress here.
Regarding those specific studies which analyze the effect of dual EPL on training
incidence, especially in Spain, Alba-Ramirez (1994) and Rica et al. (2008) document
that firms invest less in temporary workers, due to their high turnover rate. Yet, they
do not look at how this training gap changes with the firing-costs gap. Recently Garda
(2012), using a largedataset of theSpanishSocial Security, analyzeswage losses of per-
manent and temporary workers due to displacement during massive layoffs in Spain.
Her findings suggest that the former suffer larger and more persistent wage losses than
the latter, a result which is interpreted as firm specific human capital beingmore impor-
tant for workers under permanent contracts than for those under fixed-term contracts.
Finally, as regards the effect of dual EPL on effort, the closest paper in spirit
to ours is Engellandt and Riphahn (2005), who find evidence that Swiss temporary
workers undertakemore unpaid overtimework than permanent workers. Yet, as will be
discussed further below, this seemingly opposite results to ours could be rationalized
within our analytical framework. The insight is that, being the EPL gap and the share
of temporary workers in Switzerland (these authors report 3.4% on average during
1996–2001) much lower than in Spain, Swiss firms often use temporary contracts as
a screening device, rather than as a (“dead end”) cost-reduction device. As a result,
Swiss temporary workers enjoy much larger conversion rates (about 26% per year)
than in Spain and hence get incentivized to exert higher effort.
3 A simple model of decisions in a dual labour market
Before moving to the details of the model, it is important to clarify that, in our
setup, firms do not use temporary contracts (TC, henceforth) as a pure screen-
ing device (indeed, workers are assumed to be ex-ante equally skilled).5 This is
5 For an analysis of this alternative mechanism, see Michelacci and Pijoan-Mas (2012).
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not that restrictive since the probation period for workers under TCs in Spain is
much shorter (typically 1 or 2 months) than the standard duration of these con-
tracts (2 or 3 years), which are kept alive until their termination (see Cahuc et al.
2012). Firms use TCs to hire workers because they yield a larger initial surplus
than permanent contracts (PC, hereafter) due to their much less stringent EPL.
The key feature of the TC considered here is that it has a fixed-term duration
and that it cannot be renewed using the same worker. Hence, upon expiration
of a TC, the firm faces the decision of either non renewal or conversion into a
PC.
Our characterization of TC builds upon ideas reminiscent of promotion tourna-
ments in setups where effort is not contractible. In addition to wages, firms have
another instrument available to improve temporary workers’ performance when their
incentives are not aligned. This instrument is the fraction of temporary workers that
employers upgrade from a set of eligible candidates (i.e., the temp-to-perm conver-
sion rate), subject to workers’ incentive and participation constraints. In particular,
the (endogenously determined) upgrading probability is modeled as the product of
two probabilities: p(e, ea)R. The first term, p(e, ea), is the hazard rate at which a
temporary worker becomes eligible for promotion, which depends on her effort (e)
relative to the average effort exerted by co-workers (ea). The second term, R ∈ [0,
1], is the conversion rate set by the employer among the set of eligible candidates
holding TC.
Moreover, the tournament we consider here differs from a pure rank tournament,
where individuals get ranked and the top one gets a predetermined prize (see Lazear
and Rosen 1981). The main difference is that this prize cannot be guaranteed in our
setup because the employer may abstain from promoting any temporary worker, and
instead continue using TC in sequence. In other words, even if the worker exerts
maximal effort, her TC might not be upgraded because the much more stringent EPL
for PCmay prevent any promotion. Hence, the conventional result in rank tournaments
that a lower value of R (to be interpreted here as a larger prize) induces greater effort
among all workers does not necessarily hold here.6
For convenience, effort is assumed to be bounded and normalized such that e ∈
[0, 1]. Temporary (subscriptT) andpermanent (subscript P)workers’ effort are denoted
as eT and eP , respectively. Denoting the first (second) partial derivatives of p(·, ·)with
respect to (w.r.t., hereafter) eT and ea by p1 and p2 (p11 and p22), respectively, the
hazard rate is assumed to satisfy the following properties: (i) p1(eT , ea) > 0 and
p2(eT , ea) < 0, (ii) p11(eT , ea) < 0 and p22(eT , ea) > 0, (iii) p(ea, ea) < 1 for
ea < 1, (iv) p(0, ea) = 0, and (v) p(1, 1) = 1. Thus, p(·, ·) is increasing and concave
on eT , and decreasing and convex on ea . In a symmetric equilibrium with eT = ea ,
which is the one considered in the sequel, the hazard rate is less than unity if eT < 1,
whereas it equals unity if eT = 1. For illustrative purposes, we will consider below
6 The key result in Lazear and Rosen (1981) is that effort depends on the spread between the top prize
and the other lower prizes. As can be seen in their first-order condition given in Eq. (6), where the expected
spread is equated to marginal cost of exerting effort, reductions in this spread unambiguously lead to lower
effort since the cost of effort is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of effort.
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the specific functional form p(eT , ea) = eλT e−κa , with λ, κ ∈ (0, 1) and λ > κ , that
satisfies all the previous properties.7
Workers under TC negotiate a wage schedule with the firm,wT (eT ), which depends
on their level of effort, eT . Their instantaneous utility is of the form U = wT (eT ) −
φ
2 e
2
T , where φ > 0 captures an increasing and convex cost of exerting effort. The
difference between PC and TC is not only that the former are open-ended contracts
but also that they are subject to amuchmore stringent EPL. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that PC entail a firing cost F > 0 while TC contracts entail none. This allows
us to interpret F directly as the firing-costs gap (= F − 0), which should not to be
confused with the overall level of EPL since temporary workers enjoy none. Workers
under a PC receive a wage, wP (eP ), and exert a level of effort, eP . In contrast to eT ,
eP happens to be contractible and is determined by Nash bargaining jointly with the
wage.8 Furthermore, unlike temporary jobs which are kept alive until their termination
date, permanent jobs are subject to an exogenous destruction rate, denoted as δ.
Finally, the remaining notation to be used in the sequel is as follows. Let V i and
i , for i = {T, P}, be the asset values of a worker with contract i and of a firm with
job i , respectively. Also V
u
and H denote the asset values for the outside options of
workers being unemployed and of firms opening a vacancy (always consisting of a
temporary job), respectively. To highlight in a tractable way the incentives’ channel
explored here, we simplify the analysis by taking both of these asset values to be
exogenously given. Thus, our approach is a partial equilibrium one where we focus
on the short-term effects of changes in F on the endogenous variables in the model
(effort, conversion rates, wages, and training). Rents to be shared arise in this setup
because we consider those cases where the asset values of workers being employed
and firms opening vacancies exceed the given values of their outside options.
To explain concisely themechanism stressed here,we start by laying out a simplified
version of the model which focuses exclusively on workers’ effort decisions. Training
decisions by employers will be incorporated later.
3.1 Temporary jobs
3.1.1 First-order conditions
Temporary workers decide howmuch effort to exert, eT , taking as given both the wage
schedule, wT (eT ), and the firm’s choice of the conversion rate, R. These workers
maximize their discounted utility, given by,
7 Similar qualitative results are obtained for other functional forms, like e.g., p(eT , ea) =
1−exp(−λeT )
1−exp(−λ) /
1−exp(−κea )
1−exp(−κ) , with eT ∈ [0, 1], λ, κ ∈ (0, 1) and λ > κ.
8 As mentioned earlier, one way of modelling variable effort by workers under permanent contracts could
be by introducing the possibility of shirking in these jobs, as in Güell (2003) and Ichino and Riphahn (2005).
We ignore this issue here because, as discussed later on, changes in EPL did not affect on impact a large
majority of these workers.
123
430 SERIEs (2016) 7:421–459
V T = max
eT
{
wT (eT ) − φ
2
e2T + β
[
p(eT , ea)RV
P + (1 − p(eT , ea)R) V u
]}
(3.1)
For an interior solution, the first-order condition (f.o.c.) to this problem is given
by,
w′T (eT ) + βp1(eT , ea)R[V P − V u] = φeT , (3.2)
wherew′T (eT ) denotes the first derivative ofwT (eT ) . For given values of R, theRHSof
(3.2) captures themarginal cost to theworker of exerting additional effort,while the two
terms in the LHS represent the worker’s marginal benefits. These involve a wage rise
and a higher upgrading probability. Notice that, since βp1(eT , ea)R[V P − V u] > 0,
(3.2) implies that thewage rise is lower than themarginal disutility of effort (w′T (eT ) <
φeT ) because the employer can also use the conversion rate to incentivize temporary
worker’s effort. Thus, Eq. (3.2) defines the locus of the optimal level of effort chosen
by the worker, taking as given the conversion rate selected by the employer. Once
wT (eT ) is defined below, it will be shown that the fact that w′T (eT ) < φeT , together
with the concavity of p(eT , ea) on eT , ensures the second-order condition (s.o.c.) for
the maximization of V T w.r.t. eT .
Next, given that effort by temporary workers is assumed not to be contractible, the
firm chooses eT and R subject to the worker’s participation and incentive constraints,
denoted in short as PAC and I NC, respectively. Since I NC is given by (3.2), the
firm chooses the point in this locus that maximizes the value of a filled job. Then, the
firm’s optimization problem becomes,
T = max
eT ,R
{
f (eT ) − wT (eT ) + β
(
p(eT , ea)R
P + [1 − p(eT , ea)R]H
)}
(3.3)
s.t.
V T ≥ V u (PAC) (3.4)
w′T (eT ) + βp1(eT , ea)R[V P − V u] = φeT , (I NC) (3.5)
where f (eT ) is the amount of goods produced by the worker, such that f ′(eT ) > 0,
f ′′(eT ) < 0. For simplicity, this production function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas
(CD): f (eT ) = eαT , with 0 < α < 1. Under the assumed hazard function, replacing
(3.5) into (3.3) and restricting attention to interior solutions leads to the following
f.o.c.,9
f ′(eT ) − w′T (eT ) +
[
2φeT − w′T (eT ) − w′′T (eT )eT
]
D/λ = 0, (3.6)
where D = (P − H)/(V P − V u) is the ratio in equilibrium of the (net) asset values
of firms and workers in permanent jobs which, as will be shown below, depends on the
9 It is assumed that the bargained wage schedule below ensures that PAC in (3.4) holds.
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firing-costs gap, F.Hence, the optimal values of eT and R can be obtained recursively:
(i) first, equation (3.6) can be solved for eT , once the value of D is plugged in, and
(ii) next, R is determined from (3.5).
The wage schedule. The firm and the worker in a temporary job negotiate the wage
schedule through Nash bargaining. With γT ∈ (0, 1) denoting the worker’s bargaining
power, the wage paid to a temporary worker exerting effort eT becomes,
wT (eT ) = γT f (eT ) + (1 − γT )[0.5φe2T + (1 − β)V u]. (3.7)
3.1.2 Second-order conditions
The next step is to check the s.o.c. for an interior maximum in the worker’s and
employer’s optimization problems. To do so, we use (3.7) to rewrite I NC and the
f.o.c. in (3.6) as follows,
γT [ f ′(eT ) − φeT ] + βp1(eT , ea)R[V P − V u] = 0, (3.8)
(1 − γT )[ f ′(eT ) − φeT ] + γT
[
2φeT − α f ′(eT )
]
D/λ = 0. (3.9)
As regards the worker’s optimization problem, both terms in the LHS of (3.8) are
decreasing in eT .Thus the objective function in (3.1) is strictly concave on eT ensuring
the s.o.c. for an interior solution.
However, this may not be the case in the employer’s optimization problem in (3.3).
In effect, it is easy to check that the first term in the LHS of (3.9) is decreasingwhile the
second term is increasing in eT . Hence, the first part of the objective function in (3.3)
is concave while the second one is convex. As a result, the s.o.c. cannot be ensured.
In Appendix A we derive a condition (labeled as concavity condition or CC in short)
which ensures the strict concavity of T and the existence of interior solutions for eT
and R in (3.3).
Concavity condition (CC).The optimization problem (3.3)–(3.5) has interiormaxima
in eT and R when the following condition holds,
γT
[
1 + α
λ
D
]
< 1. (3.10)
Remark 1 For given values of D and α, notice thatCC requires sufficiently low values
of the temporary workers’ bargaining power, γT , and/or high values of λ, that is, the
elasticity of p(·, ·) w.r.t. eT .10 The insight for these parameter bounds comes from the
opposite signs of the two terms that arise from differentiating the f.o.c. (3.9) w.r.t. eT ,
namely, (1 − γT )[ f ′′(eT ) − φ] + γT (D/λ)
[
2φ − α f ′′(eT )
]
. The overall sign of this
expression is ambiguous because [ f ′′(eT ) − φ] is negative while
[
2φ − α f ′′(eT )
]
is
positive. The role of CC is to increase (reduce) the weight of the first (second) term
10 There is abundant evidence that the bargaining power of temporary workers in Spain is quite low since,
due to legal obstacles, their union affiliation rates are much lower than that of permanent workers (see.,
e.g., Dolado et al. 2010).
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ensuring that the overall sign of the sum of the two terms becomes negative, as required
by the s.o.c.
3.1.3 The relationship between effort and conversion rate
Having replaced (3.7) into (3.2), differentiation of I NC yields,
[
γT
(
f ′′(eT ) − φ
) + βp11(eT , ea)R[V P − V u]
]
deT
+βp1(eT , ea)[V P − V u]dR = 0,
from where it is straightforward to check that deT /dR > 0. In particular, using the
chosen functional forms for p(eT , ea) and f (eT ), in a symmetric equilibrium with
eT = ea , we have that,
deT
dR
= βλe
λ−κ−1
T [V P − V
u]
βλ(1 − λ)eλ−κ−2T R[V P − V
u] + γT [φ + α(1 − α)eα−2T ]
> 0. (3.11)
Thus, for a given value of F , our assumptions imply that firms’ temp-to-perm
conversion rates and temporary workers’ effort are unambiguously positively related.
3.2 Permanent jobs
Asmentioned earlier, workers under PC are entitled to firing costs F > 0 if dismissed.
Given the higher job stability of these workers, we assume that their level of effort,
eP , is contractible (see below). Moreover, to capture the fact that these are “better”
jobs than temporary jobs, we assume that workers under PC produce an amount of
output given by z(F) f (eP ), where z(F) > 1 is a technology parameter representing
higher productivity in these jobs.11 The assumption that z depends on F is a convenient
one to model changes in permanent workers’ effort when F changes. It captures the
two views discussed in the Introduction about the effects of overall EPL strictness
on technical efficiency. On the one hand, if the stringency of dismissal laws induces
firms to choose better technologies (due to the higher stability of their workers), then
z′(F) > 0. On the other hand, if firms were to choose less advanced technologies
(due to the lower mobility of workers), then z′(F) < 0 . Under these assumptions, the
corresponding asset values to firms and workers under PC become, respectively,
V P = wP (eP ) − φ
2
e2P + β[δ(V u + F) + (1 − δ)V P ], (3.12)
P = z(F) f (eP ) − wP (eP ) + β[δ(H − F) + (1 − δ)P ], (3.13)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is an (exogenously given) job destruction rate.
11 See Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) for evidence in this respect as regards
Spain and Italy.
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The level of effort and the wage associated to a PC are determined by Nash bar-
gaining, with γP ∈ (0, 1) denoting permanent workers’ bargaining power, which may
differ from γT . Thus, both variables are chosen to maximize the Nash maximand
[V P − (V u + F)]γP [P − (H − F)]1−γP . This implies that the optimal level of effort
satisfies,
z(F) f ′(eP ) = φeP , (3.14)
and that the sharing rule is,
γP [P − (H − F)] = (1 − γP )[V P − (V u + F)], (3.15)
so that, from (3.12)–(3.15), the wage schedule becomes,
wP (eP ) = γP z(F) f (eP ) + (1 − γP )[0.5φeP2 + (1 − β)V u] + (1 − β)F.
(3.16)
Differentiating (3.14) w.r.t. F , and taking into account that f ′′(eT ) < 0, it follows
that,
deP
dF
= z
′(F) f ′(eP )
φ − z(F) f ′′(eP ) ⇒ sign
(
deP
dF
)
= sign (z′(F)) . (3.17)
Hence, since z(F) and eP are complements in production, a rise in F increases the
effort exerted by workers under PC if firms improve their technology (z′(F) > 0),
while it decreases their effort otherwise (z′(F) < 0).
Finally, using (3.15) leads to the following asset values,12
P − H = (1 − γP )[z(F) f (eP ) − 0.5φe
2
P − (1 − β)V
u]
1 − β(1 − δ) − F > 0, (3.18)
V P − VU = γP [z(F) f (eP ) − 0.5φe
2
P − (1 − β)V
u]
1 − β(1 − δ) + F > 0. (3.19)
From these two expressions and (3.14), we get that d(
P−H)
dF = (1−γP )[z
′(F) f (eP )]
1−β(1−δ) − 1
and d(V
P−V u)
dF = γP [z
′(F) f (eP )]
1−β(1−δ) + 1. This illustrates how an increase in F affects
the previous asset values through two channels. The first one is the direct effect of
a rise in F on z(F), which increases (decreases) both asset values when z′(F) >
0 (z′(F) ≤ 0). Secondly, there are two opposite effects (−1 and +1) which are
just the outcome of a hold-up problem whereby the worker, once employed under a
PC, cannot credibly refrain from exploiting an enhanced bargaining position. Hence,
severance pay reduces the employer’s threat point (H − F), whilst it increases the
12 To ensure that permanent jobs have positive net value we also impose that F is subject to the following
(implicit) upper bound condition, F ≤ (1−γP )[z(F) f (eP )−0.5φeP−(1−β)V
U ]
1−β(1−δ) .
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worker’ s threat point (V
U + F). As a result, the ratio of asset values, D(≡ P−H
V P−VU ),
required to pin down the optimal value of eT from Eq. (3.6), declines with F when
z′(F) ≤ 0, while their relationship remains ambiguous when z′(F) > 0. These key
properties will be used in the next section to analyze the impact of changes in F on
eT and R.
3.3 The effect of a change in the firing-costs gap on effort and conversion rate
To analyze how a change in F affects firms’ and workers’ decisions in temporary jobs,
it is convenient to start by examining the response of eT to this change. To simplify
the derivations, let us denote the first and the second term (excluding D) in the LHS
of (3.9) by h1(eT ) and h2(eT ), respectively. Then, totally differentiating the f.o.c.
h1(eT ) + h2(eT )D = 0 w.r.t. F yields,
[
h′1(eT ) + h′2(eT )D
] deT
dF
= − h1(eT )
(P − H)(V P − V u)
(
(P − H) + (V P − V u) − z
′(F) f (eP )
1 − β(1 − δ) F
)
.
(3.20)
It was shown earlier that h1(eT ) < 0 in equilibrium. Moreover, under CC , [h′1(eT ) +
h′2(eT )D] < 0 since this term is just the s.o.c. for an interior maximum in (3.3). Hence,
for z′(F) ≤ 0 it holds that deT /dF < 0, whereas for z′(F) > 0 the sign deT /dF
turns out to be ambiguous.
Next, to find how R responds to a change in F , let us totally differentiate (3.8) w.r.t.
F , yielding,
dR
dF
= −βp1R
∂(V P−V u)
∂F + {γT [ f ′′(eT ) − φ] + βp11R[V P − V
u]} deTdF
βp1[V P − V u]
. (3.21)
Given the properties of p(·, ·), [V P − VU ] and f (·), we have that dR/dF < 0
if z′(F) ≤ 0, since deT /dF < 0. Thus, under CC, an increase in F translates into
both lower effort and conversion rate. However, when z′(F) > 0, such a change in F
has ambiguous effects on both variables. The following proposition summarizes this
discussion.
Proposition 1 Under the concavity condition (CC) in (3.10), an exogenous increase
in the firing-cost gap F between permanent and temporary workers leads to: (i) a
reduction in both the optimal temp-to-perm conversion rate chosen by firms and the
optimal level of effort exerted by temporary workers if permanent workers respond to
a change in the gap by exerting less or equal effort (z′(F) ≤ 0), and (ii) ambiguous
effects on both variables if permanent workers exert higher effort (z′(F) > 0).
Remark 2 The insight for the above results is as follows. As F increases, the conver-
sion rate decreases when z′(F) ≤ 0 because the value to the firm of having a worker
123
SERIEs (2016) 7:421–459 435
Table 1 Example 1
eT R(%) wT wP V
T − VU V P − VU T P
F = 0.55 0.700 8.64 0.698 1.101 0.185 2.601 0.351 0.332
F = 0.60 0.668 6.80 0.685 1.104 0.178 2.654 0.351 0.282
with a PC is unambiguously lower. A fall in the conversion rate decreases worker’s
effort because it reduces its payoff in terms of the option value of being upgraded.
However, there is a counteracting effect since a higher gap increases the value of a PC
to the worker. This increases the payoff from effort and therefore tends to increase it.
Under CC, the first effect dominates the second effect. However, when z′(F) > 0, the
value to the firm of a permanent job could go up or down as a result of a rise in F ,
making ambiguous the responses of both variables.
Example 1 In order to illustrate the effects of an increase in the firing-costs gap (F)
on the conversion rate (R) and temporary workers’ effort (eT ), we present numerical
results for a simple economy with z′(F) = 0 and the following parameter values
(which satisfy the restrictions required for interior solutions and for the profitability
of permanent jobs): A = 1.2, α = 0.4, φ = 1, λ = 0.6, κ = 0.3, β = 0.96, δ =
0.1, (1 − β)V u = 0.3, H = 0, γP = 0.7, γT = 0.3, z(F) = 1.4 and eP = 0.76.
Solutions for the endogenous variables using two different values of F (=0.55 and
0.66) are provided in Table 1.
As can be observed, an increase in F from 0.55 to 0.60 reduces eT from 0.70 to
0.67, as well as R which declines from 8.64% to 6.80%. Note that the value of a
temporary job to the firm (T ) is higher than the value of a permanent job (P ), thus
rationalizing why all new jobs are created under TC.
3.4 Adding paid-for-training to the model
We next extend the previous analysis to incorporate firms’ decisions on the amount
of paid–for-training provided to temporary workers. Our simplifying assumption here
is that this training provides specific human capital which only increases workers’
productivity with one period lag, that is, when they become permanent workers. Oth-
erwise, the worker loses the received firm-specific training. Firms choose the amount
of training, denoted by τ , facing a cost, C(τ ), which is assumed to be linear, i.e.,
C(τ ) = cτ , with c > 0. Thus, while output in a temporary job, f (eT ), remains
the same as in the model ignoring training, output in a permanent job becomes now
g(τ )z(F) f (eP ), with g′ > 0 and g′′ < 0.
Therefore, in this case, the value of a permanent job to the firm, denoted as P (τ)
is given by,
P = g(τ )z(F) f (eP ) − wP (eP, τ ) + β[δ(H − F) + (1 − δ)P (τ )]. (3.22)
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Using the same Nash sharing rule as in (3.14), we get ,
P (τ ) − H = (1 − γP )[g(τ )z(F) f (eP ) − 0.5φe
2
P − (1 − β)V
u]
1 − β(1 − δ) − F, (3.23)
V P (τ ) − V u = γP [g(τ )z(F) f (eP ) − 0.5e
2
Pφ
2 − (1 − β)V u]
1 − β(1 − δ) + F. (3.24)
The analysis proceeds as in the previous section, noticing that the new wage sched-
ule for workers under TC now depends on both eT and τ . Consequently, temporary
workers’ utility maximization problem remains the same as in the model without
training, while the firm’s profit maximization problem becomes now,
T = max
e,τ,R
{ f (eT ) − wT (eT , τ ) − cτ
+β
[
p(eT , ea)R
P + (1 − p(eT , ea)R)H
]}
(3.25)
s.t.
V T ≥ VU :::: (PAC), (3.26)
wT,1(eT , τ ) + βp1(eT , ea)R[V P (τ ) − V u] = φeT (I NC), (3.27)
where wT,1(e, τ ) denotes the first derivative of wT (e, τ ) (shown below) w.r.t. e. The
f.o.c. of the optimization problems of firms a workers under TC become,
f ′(eT ) − wT,1(eT , τ ) +
[
2φeT − wT,11(eT , τ )eT − wT,1(eT , τ )
]
D(τ )/λ, (3.28)
(1 − γT )c + γT [ f ′(eT ) − φeT ]eT D′(τ )/λ = 0, (3.29)
where D(τ ) = [P (τ ) − H ]/[V T (τ ) − V u], D′(τ ) is its first derivative, and wT,11
(eT , τ ) is the second derivative of wT (eT , τ ) w.r.t. e. Notice that (3.28) and (3.29)
determine the optimal values of eT and τ , while I NC in (3.27) determines R.
Wage schedules The wages paid to a temporary worker exerting effort eT and receiv-
ing paid-for- training, τ , and to a permanent worker exerting effort eP become now,
respectively,
wT (eT , τ ) = γT [ f (eT ) − cτ ] + (1 − γT )
(
0.5φe2T + (1 − β)V u
)
, (3.30)
wP (τ ) = γPg(τ )z(F) f (eP ) + (1 − γP )
(
0.5φe2P + (1 − β)V u
)
+ (1 − β)F.
(3.31)
Since (3.28) has the same form as (3.9), interior maxima exist under CC (i.e.,
for sufficiently low values of γT and high values of λ). With the same notation as in
(3.20), we can use (3.30)–(3.31) to rewrite (3.28) as h1(eT )+h2(eT )D(τ ) = 0, where
h′1(eT ) + h′2(eT )D(τ ) < 0, h1(eT ) < 0 and D′(τ ) > 0. Then, differentiation of this
expression w.r.t. eT and τ (for a given value of F) yields,
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Table 2 Example 2
eT R(%) τ wT wP V
T − VU V P − VU T P
F = 0.55 0.7717 12.53 0.6897 0.7357 1.269 0.218 3.843 0.338 0.860
F = 0.60 0.7438 10.59 0.6437 0.716 1.230 0.202 3.582 0.336 0.681
deT
dτ
= h1(eT )D
′(τ )/D(τ )
h′1(eT ) + h′2(eT )D(τ )
> 0. (3.32)
This signifies that, in equilibrium, effort and training behave as complements. Next,
using the same reasoning as in Proposition 1, it is easy to check that when z′(F) ≤ 0,
CC leads not only to a fall of eT and R when F goes up but also to a fall in τ . However,
when z′(F) > 0, the response of the three variables to a rise in F is ambiguous. These
results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 When firms are allowed to choose the amount of paid-for-training pro-
vided to temporary workers, under the condition in (3.10), an exogenous increase
in the firing-cost gap F between permanent and temporary workers leads to (i)
lower training, effort and temp-to-perm conversion rate if permanent workers react
to the change in the gap by exerting less or equal effort (z′(F) ≤ 0), and (ii)
ambiguous effects on these three variables if permanent workers exert higher effort
(z′(F) > 0).
Example 2 The results above can be illustrated by simulating the effects of an increase
in the firing-costs gap on the endogenous variables for an economy with the same
parameters as in Example 1, but where now firms are allowed to provide training (τ )
to temporary workers. It is assumed that g(τ ) = Cτ θ , with C = 1.5 and θ = 0.6,
while c = 0.04 in the training cost function. Results are presented in Table 2
As can be observed, a rise in F from 0.55 to 0.60 reduces eT from 0.7717 to
0.7438, R from 12.53% to 10.59% and τ from 0.6887 to 0.6427. Note that the fact
that P > T does not mean that the firm will choose to create new jobs under
PC, as T is now the value of a job filled with a worker who has not received train-
ing yet, while P is the value of a job filled with a worker who has already been
trained.
3.5 From the model to the data
Lacking any direct proxy for workers’ effort and paid-for training in our panel dataset,
our indirect strategy is to embed these variables into firms’ TFP, which can then be
estimated from the available data on their output and inputs. In particular, it is assumed
that each firm has the following constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas (CD)
production function,
Y = A(e, z)(LT + ϑLP)αL X1−αL
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where Y is final output; A (· ,·) is a composite index of TFP which depends on
two sets of variables: (i) our variables of interest, effort (eT , eP ) and training (τ ),
collected in vector e, which are assumed to have a contemporaneous impact effect
on TFP, and (ii) other determinants of technology choice (such as R&D expendi-
ture, educational characteristics of the workforce, etc.), collected in vector z, which
are taken as predetermined since, by involving investment decisions on human and
IT capital subject to adjustment costs, they are likely to exhibit delayed responses
to changes in the dual EPL gap (F); LP and LT are total hours of work by each
type of workers, while X denotes additional production inputs (i.e., capital and raw
materials). In line with the theoretical model, it is assumed that the labour inputs
LT and LP are substitutes, with different relative productivity captured by parame-
ter ϑ . Denoting with small letters the logs. of capital ones, (logged) TFP, a, can be
computed from the estimation of the parameters of the production function using
firm-level data. An important issue to recall is that our estimate of a is constructed
such that it does not depend on the composition of inputs in the production func-
tion.
Since we are interested in isolating the impact of changes in F on a, via its effect
on R and then on e, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach, where a is
regressed on R and the predetermined variables in z, using F as an IV for R. As
stressed before, the underlying mechanism is that exogenous changes in F have an
impact effect on R which then translates quickly into changes in a, via e, without
affecting z contemporaneously.
From these considerations, our benchmark empirical model of firms’ TFP can be
simply expressed as a = a(e(R), z), or a = a(R, z) in short notation, to which
a disturbance term capturing unobserved components of TFP should be appended
(see Sect. 4.2 for more details). Since eP , eT and R are endogenously determined
and depend on F , our strategy relies on analyzing the impact of three major labour
market reforms in Spain (in 1994, 1997 and 2002) which involved relevant regula-
tory changes in the EPL gap during the available sample period. Given that these
were nationwide reforms, our implicit identification strategy to achieve variation at
the firm level is as follows. All else equal, an exogenous change in F is likely to
affect R differently in each firm, depending on their share of temporary workers
(tw = LT /(LP + LT )) the year before the reforms took place, i.e., tw−1. Although,
our theoretical model in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 is one of the a “single vacancy-single
worker” type, in reality it seems reasonable to assume that TFP in firms with a high
share of TC will exhibit a stronger response to changes in R (induced by nationwide
variations in F) than in firms with a low share of TC. The best way to capture this
channel is to include an interaction term of R and tw−1 (i.e., R ∗ tw−1) as an addi-
tional covariate in the previous model, so that our preferred empirical specification
becomes,
a = a(R, R ∗ tw−1, z). (3.33)
Accordingly, the impact effect of changes in R (driven by changes in F) on a differs
according to the lagged share tw−1. Notice that, since our estimation approach implies
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that, once we control for z, a does not depend on the composition of labour inputs,
tw−1 also becomes a predetermined variable.13
4 Data
Ourmicrodata at the firm level come from the Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta
sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE). This is an annual survey on a representative
sample of Spanish firms in 18 manufacturing sectors which has the advantage of
providing the key variables required to compute TFP and temp-to-perm conversion
rates (see below). The available sample period is 1991–2005. Firms were chosen in the
base year according to a sampling schemeapplied to each industry in themanufacturing
sectorwhereweights depend on their size category.While allmanufacturing firmswith
more than 200 employees are surveyed and their participation rate in the survey reaches
approximately 70%, smaller firms with 10–200 employees are surveyed according to
a random sampling scheme with a participation rate close to 5%.
Another important feature of ESSE is that the initial sampling properties have been
maintained throughout all subsequent years. Newly created and exiting firms have
been recorded in each year with the same sampling criteria as in the base year. As a
result of this entry and exit process, the data set is an unbalanced panel comprising
3,759 firms and 22,292 firm-year observations.
Finally, it is worth noticing that ESEE provides firm-level price indexes to deflate
the different components of TFP. This is an important advantage over traditional TFP
measures where nominal variables are deflated with industry- level price indexes,
which have been criticized because changes in estimated TFP may reflect market
power at the industry level rather than genuine differences in efficiency at the firm
level (see Syverson 2011). In this sense, our productivity measure is close to the
“physical productivity” defined in Foster et al. (2008).
4.1 Temporary work
Table 3 presents the average share of temporary workers, tw, by firm’s size and age.
With regard to size, small firms are defined as those with less than 50 employees,
while medium-sized and large firms are those with more than 50 but less than 200
employees, and more than 200 employees, respectively. Regarding age, young firms
are defined as those which have been operating during less than 5 years since theywere
opened, while mature firms are those which have been operating for a longer period.
As can be observed, tw exhibits large variability across these categories. In general,
small and medium-sized young firms exhibit larger shares of TC perhaps because
newer firms are bound to make amore widespread use of flexible TC for precautionary
reasons given that they often face a higher probability of failure.
13 As explained in Sect. 5 below, to instrument R we use dummy variables for the three major EPL
reforms and their inteactions with lagged temporary work shares at a more aggregate level, which result
from combining firms in different industry, size and age categories.
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Table 3 Proportion of temporary workers by firm’s age and size
Mean SD Obs
Small and medium-sized firms (less than 200 employees)
Less than 5 years in the market 41.5 31.0 2641
More than 5 years in the market 20.4 22.1 12,833
Large firms (more than 200 employees)
Less than 5 years in the market 18.5 22.7 276
More than 5 years in the market 15.4 16.5 6,542
Source: ESEE (1991–205)
Next, we proceed to describe the computation of both firms’ TFP and conversion
rates.
4.2 Measuring TFP
To construct a measure of TFP at the firm level, we use Levinsohn and Petrin’ s
(2003, henceforth LP) modification of Olley and Pakes (1996) well-known estima-
tion approach for the parameters of production functions using inputs to control for
unobservables.
Rather than simply using cost shares to compute conventional Solow residuals, the
reason for adopting LP’s (2003) approach is that, while we allow for deviations of the
one-to-one rate of substitution among workers, the payrolls reported by ESEE do not
distinguish between wages paid by type of contract (PC and TC). Thus, we estimate
ait for firm i in period t as the residual in,
yit = αL ln(LT,i t + ϑLP,i t ) + αmmit + αkkit + ait ,
where y is logged final output; m and k are respectively logged materials and capital
(weighted by its logged annual average capacity utilization rate reported by each firm).
CRS imply that αL = 1 − αm − αk .
To estimate the parameters in the production function, we assume that ait is the
sum of two unobserved components,
ait = ωi t + υi t ,
where ωi t represents a firm-specific component which is known to the firm, and υi t
is an idiosyncratic component unknown to the firm, but with no impact on firm’s
decisions. The endogeneity problem in estimating the production function by OLS
arises from the correlation of ωi t with the input choices. Olley and Pakes (1996)
consider k as a quasi-fixed input while the other inputs are more freely adjustable.
As a result, their approach relies upon the assumption that investment, i , installed in
period t only becomes productive at t + 1, so that ii t = i(ωi t , kit ) can be inverted to
yield ωi t = ωt (ii t , kit ), assuming increasing monotonicity of ii t in ωi t . By contrast,
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Table 4 Estimates of production function parameters with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach
Industry ϑ αL αk αm N Na
Ferric and non ferric metals 1.863*** 0.317*** 0.101*** 0.582*** 739 716
Non metallic mineral
products
1.745*** 0.224*** 0.094*** 0.682*** 1675 1541
Chemical products 1.872*** 0.334** 0.187*** 0.479*** 1616 1503
Metallic products 1.913*** 0.414*** 0.202*** 0.384*** 2050 1886
Agricultural and industrial
machinery
1.742*** 0.425*** 0.057*** 0.528*** 1473 1399
Office machinery, data
processing machinery, etc.
1.474*** 0.414** 0.083** 0.498*** 364 345
Electrical material and
electrical accessories
1.488*** 0.382*** 0.105*** 0.513*** 1586 1475
Vehicles and motors 1.695*** 0.365** 0.102*** 0.533*** 1117 1050
Other transport material 1.428*** 0.299** 0.121*** 0.580*** 463 444
Meat and meat products 1.345*** 0.326*** 0.089** 0.585*** 680 646
Food and tobacco 1.327*** 0.280*** 0.159*** 0.561*** 2322 2136
Beverages 1.305*** 0.273** 0.087*** 0.640*** 511 475
Textiles and apparels 1.348*** 0.402*** 0.075*** 0.523*** 2421 2251
Leather products and shoes 1.327*** 0.273** 0.138*** 0.589*** 772 710
Wood and furniture 1.289*** 0.388*** 0.183*** 0.429*** 1829 1683
Paper, paper products and
printing products
1.362*** 0.291*** 0.093*** 0.616*** 1949 1813
Plastic products and rubber 1.275*** 0.394*** 0.123*** 0.483*** 1004 943
Other manufactured products 1.778*** 0.393*** 0.162** 0.445*** 551 523
** Significant at 10%, ** at 5% , *** at1%. CRS are not rejected in all cases with p-values always exceeding
0.20; N is the number of firms in each industry; Na denotes the number of available observations satisfying
the assumptions of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
instead of using the investment demand function, LP (2003) advocate to invert the
materials’ demand functionmit = m(ωi t , kit ) to obtain ωi t = ωt (mit , kit ), also under
monotonicity plus some additional assumptions.14 The justification for this alternative
choice is that, while most firms (99.3% in our sample) report positive expenditure on
materials every year, amuch lower proportion (about 52%) undertake investment every
year. Truncating about half of the sample would imply a severe efficiency loss, and
hence our choice of LP’ s (2003) approach. Appendix B provides further details of
this estimation approach.
In Table 4 we report the estimates of the parameters in each of the 18 industries
considered in ESEE, where CRS is imposed in all instances since the null hypothesis
that the sum of the input elasticities equals unity cannot be rejected at conventional
significance levels. The similarity of the number of firms in each industry (N ) and
those which buy materials every year in the sample (Na) illustrates the advantages of
14 For example, input prices are assumed to be common across firms.
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using LP’s (2003) approach. Overall, the coefficients on labour, capital and materials
are in line with those available in the literature using data on Spanish firms (see,
e.g., Aguirregabiría and Alonso-Borrego 2014, and González and Miles 2012). As
expected, the estimate of parameter ϑ is always above unity.
4.3 Conversion rates
Our dataset provides direct information on the types of contracts used by firms in each
year of the sample, from which conversion rates at the firm level can be retrieved. In
effect, we have data on the number of permanent and temporary workers in firm i at
period t (LP,i t and LT,i t , respectively), as well as on the number of PC which have
been signed in each year by workers who previously held TC in the firm and by those
directly hired under PC. The former are denoted as LT P,i t where the subscript “TP”
signifies conversion from “T” to “P” . Using this information, we compute annual
conversion rates as Rit = LT P,i t /LT,i t−1. On average, it yields an estimate of R
equal to 0.118, namely, about 12% of temporary workers get PC contracts when their
TC expire. Interestingly, this value is quite close to the conversion rates reported in
other available studies in Spain on this topic which use information from aggregate
labour surveys and whose estimates range between 10% and 15% (see Alba-Ramirez
1994; Amuedo-Dorantes 2000, 2001, and Güell and Petrongolo 2007).
Figure 2 displays the histogram of term-to-perm conversion rates in our sample.
About 85% of firms exhibit conversion rates between 0% and 20%, and only 3%
of firms exhibit rates above 50%. Industries like “Vehicles and motors” , “Textiles
and apparels” and “Paper and printing products” are the ones with higher conversion
rates whilst other industries, like “Food and tobacco” , exhibit very low rates. In sum,
this evidence shows that, in general, Spanish manufacturing firms have been rather
Fig. 2 Weighted averages of conversion rates and firms’ TFP growth rates (ESEE, 1992–2005)
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reluctant to offer contract conversions,most plausibly due to the highEPLgap between
permanent and temporary workers.
Finally, though not reported for the sake of brevity, we also find that the fraction
of the annual inflows of new hires under a PC (denoted as LN P,i t ) in the existing
workforce, LN P,i t/Lit−1, is always rather low, with an annual average 3.5%. Since
these are the only permanent workers who would be affected on impact by the EPL
reforms, these small percentages provide some support to our conjecture that changes
in F mainly affect TFP on impact through temporary worker’s reactions.
5 Empirical strategy
Following the discussion above, to estimate the impact effect of changes in the EPLgap
on firms’ TFP, via its effect on conversion rates, we regress our measure of TFP based
on LP’s (2003) estimation approach (denoted hereafter as a˜), on R and R ∗ tw−1, plus
the set of additional predetermined controls, z, in the following dynamic panel data
model at the firm-year level,
a˜i t = ηi + ξt + ηI t + ρa˜i,t−1 + βRit + ψ(Rit ∗ twi,t−1) + γ ′zi t + vi t , (5.1)
where ηi and ξt are firm fixed and time effects, respectively, while ηI t is the interaction
of industry fixed effects (there are 18 industries) with a linear trend, to capture differ-
ences in the trending patterns of TFP across industries, and vi t is an i.i.d. error term.
Our coefficients of interest are β and ψ which are expected to be positive, because a
higher conversion rate (driven a reduction in F) leads to higher effort/ training, and
the more so in firms with a higher share of temporary workers in the previous period.
As mentioned earlier, vector z contains a set of controls which are predetermined.
Those variables in z which are likely to capture slow changes in technology adop-
tion are introduced with one lag (i.e., R&D expenditure, the proportion of employees
with a college degree, and the proportions of foreign capital and public capital), while
the remaining components of z (e.g., size, age and its square, a dummy variable for
incorporated companies, two indicators on whether the firm perceives it operates in an
expansive or recessive market, firm’ s entry, exit, merger and scission dummies) are
not lagged.15 Lastly, since TFP levels are highly persistent, a lagged the dependent
variable is also included in the regression.16 Detailed definitions of all these variables
are provided in Appendix C.
Table 5 contains descriptive statistics of the variables used in (5.1). As can be
observed, there is a large and persistent slowdown in firms’ TFP growth since the late
1990s, leading to an even negative growth rate in 2005. This path is somewhat similar
to the one discussed in the Introduction for the overall market economy, although
much less dramatic than in other sectors - like construction, distribution, personal and
15 The dummy variables take value 1 in all those periods in which the firm appears in our sample.
16 Notice that the model in (5.1) can be reparameterized as an error correction model with TFP growth,
a˜i t as the dependent variable, so that the coefficient on the the lagged dependent variable a˜i t−1 becomes
(ρ − 1) < 0. In this fashion we can rationalize the unconditional correlations between TFP growth and
conversion rates shown in Fig. 1, but this time as partial correlations.
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the sample
Mean S.D.
Average TFP growth 1992–1995 (in percent) 1.62 –
Average TFP growth 1996–2000 (in percent) 1.52 –
Average TFP growth 2001–2005 (in percent) 0.37 –
Average change in share of temp workers 1992–1995 1.53 –
Average change in share of temp workers 1996–2000 −1.12 –
Average change in share of temp workers 2001–2005 −1.08 –
Average conversion rate 1992–1995 12.55 –
Average conversion rate 1996–2000 12.78 –
Average conversion rate 2001–2005 10.30 –
Percentage of temporary workers 22.99 22.85
Proportion of newly hired permanent workers 3.55 4.01
Percentage of foreign capital 16.87 35.73
Percentage of public capital 1.15 9.59
Percentage of workers with a college degree 4.05 6.78
R&D expenditure/sales (in percentage) 0.69 2.2
Age (in years) 24.11 20.48
Percentage of incorporated companies 64.94 47.72
Percentage of entrants 7.03 25.57
Percentage of exiting firms 1.32 11.4
Percentage of firms with scission 0.66 8.09
Percentage of firms involved in a merger process 1.42 11.85
Percentage of firms reporting expansive market 29.03 45.39
Percentage of firms reporting recessive market 20.56 40.42
Source: ESEE (1991–2005)
social services- where TFP growth became negative since the mid-1990s (see Escribá
andMurgui 2009). It is also noteworthy that the average share of temporary workers in
our sample is about 23%. This is around 10 pp. lower than the aggregate share for the
whole Spanish economy because seasonal activities associated to the manufacturing
industry are much less prevalent than in the services and construction sectors.
5.1 Three EPL reforms
Following the major EPL reform in 1984, there have been three important reforms
during our available sample period 1991–2005. As stressed earlier, a key feature of
these reforms is that changes in EPL regarding permanent workers only applied to
newcomers. Thus, the EPL rights of employees under PC before the implementation
of the reforms remained unaltered. On the contrary, changes in EPL affecting TC
applied immediately to all temporary workers.
The first of these reforms took place in may 1994 (Law 10/94) when the conditions
for “fair” dismissals of workers under PC were relaxed, while those concerning the
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use of TC became more restrictive. Regarding the former, fair dismissals—involving
redundancy pay of 20 days’ wages per year of seniority (days) with a maximum of
12 months against 45 days with a maximum of 42 months of wages for “unfair”
dismissals—that could only be used for economic reasons, also qualified for organi-
zational and technological reasons. As for the latter, the most popular TC, i.e., the
so-called contrato de fomento (with a maximum duration of 3 years) was abolished,
except for some disadvantaged groups of workers. Overall, we interpret this reform
as lowering the EPL gap, F, through a less stringent EPL for PC and a more stringent
EPL for TC.
The next reform was implemented in may 1997 (Law Decrees 8 and 9/97) reducing
the above-mentioned mandatory redundancy pay in case of “unfair” dismissals to 33
days with a maximum of 24 months of wages for most new hires, with the exception
of prime-age workers (aged 30-44 years old) whose unemployment spells were below
one year. In parallel, a new severance payment of 8 days, instead of no firing cost, was
introduced for temporary workers whose contracts were not renewed and significant
rebates of social security contributions were also approved for conversions or direct
hires under the new PC (see Dolado et al. 2002).17 Thus, as before, we interpret this
reform as one where F declined.
Finally, the main feature of the reform in December 2002 (Law 45/02) was the abo-
lition of the firm’s obligation to pay interim wages when dismissed workers appealed
to labour courts, as long as the firm acknowledged the dismissal to be unfair and
deposited the highest severance pay (45 days) in court two days before the dismissal.
Although, in principle, is arguable whether this reform meant a reduction in F , there
is evidence that, in order to avoid lengthy court procedures, most employers ended
up paying much higher firing costs than the statutory ones under “fair” dismissals
(Bentolila et al. 2012). Thus, in contrast to the two previous reforms, we interpret this
reform as one where F increased.
5.1.1 Reform-based instruments
In line with the previous discussion, we use each of these reforms separately as a
source of exogenous changes in the EPL gap. The use of the LP ’s (2003) approach
when estimating TFP ensures that changes in F would subsequently affect R without
a direct impact on a˜, i.e., fulfilling the required exclusion properties for a valid IV. We
construct three step dummy variables, denoted as FS (S = 1, 2, 3), which take the
value 1 from the year after the implementation of the reforms (1995, 1998, and 2003,
respectively) until the year of implementation of the next reform (F3 goes until 2005,
the end of our sample), and 0 otherwise.
Regarding the covariates Rit and Rit ∗ twi,t−1 in Eq. (5.1), they are instrumented
using the FS dummies directly as well as their interactions with lagged temporary
work shares, on top of other conventional IVs (appropriate lags of the levels and first
differences of dependent variable and other predetermined controls) in dynamic panel
data estimation. As for the rates of temporary work used in the interacted IVs, we have
17 The rebates ranged from 40 to 60% during the first two years of the new contracts used to hire workers
in some targeted groups (youth, long-term unemployed, and women under-represented in some industries).
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chosen the one-period lags of the average values of these rates in each of the 72 cells
of firms which result from combining industry (18), size (2) and age (2) categories.
This aggregate share is labeled as twc,t−1 and its interactions with the FS dummies
are denoted respectively as FSc,t−1, (S = 1, 2, 3) where the subscript c stands for
cell.18 Hence, these IVs have variation both across cells and over time, as opposed to
the nationwide FS dummies. Also, since we are also controlling for firm’s size, our
thought experiment relies on obtaining variation from the comparison of the effects
of the reforms on firms with similar size but rather different shares of temporary
workers.
5.2 Estimation method
Since the dependent variable in (5.1), a˜i t , could be highly persistent, our fixed-
effects estimationmethod relies on Blundell and Bond (1998) System-GMMapproach
(Sys-GMM hereafter). This involves the estimation of a system of two simultaneous
equations, one in levels (with lagged first differences of the regressors as instruments)
and the other in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments). As IVs, we use
the three EPL reform dummies and their interactions with grouped shares of tempo-
rary work, besides the remaining variables in (5.1) appropriately lagged (t − 2, and
earlier, in the first-differenced equations and first differences dated at t−1 in the levels
equations).
As shown in columns [1] and [2] of Table 6, the choice of the three FS dum-
mies and the FSc,t−1 interaction terms as our key IVs for Rit and Rit ∗ twi,t−1is
seemingly validated by the relatively high partial R2’s (0.35 and 0.37) obtained in
the first-stage OLS regressions of these two variables on the two instruments and
the remaining IVs in (5.1). In particular, we find that the estimated coefficients on
FS and FSc,t−1 turn out to be strongly significant. Moreover, while the estimates
on the first two FS dummies in the regression for Rit are positive (in line with our
interpretation of the 1994 and 1997 reforms as ones where F declined), the third one
exhibits a smaller negative sign (indicating that F increased as a result of the 2002
reform).
These results are supported by the evidence shown in the scatter plots displayed
in Fig. 3, where conversion rates the year before and after each of the three reforms
are depicted, together with the 45 degree line, for each of the 72 cells defined above.
Conversion rates increase after the first two reforms, and decline after the last one.19
Finally, as a robustness check on our identification strategy, we also provide a similar
scatter plot in Fig. 4 for a placebo reform taking place in 1999, namely, a year when
18 In principle, the share of temporary work at the firm level, twi,t−1, could also have been used in the
interaction terms since, in line with LP s (2003) estimation approach of a˜i t , it is also be a predetermined
variable. However, since there could be some doubts about the absence of a direct effect of twi,t−1 in a
given year on a firm’ s TFP in future years, we prefer to use more aggregate shares at the cell level.
19 A relevant issue is whether some aspects of the reforms were anticipated by firms. If so, their hiring
decisions could have been affected before the reforms were implemented. However, the finding that the
jumps in conversion rates are rather sizeable after eachof the three reformspoint outs that that the anticipation
effects were not so important.
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Table 6 First-stage estimates in
GMM estimation
Estimation by OLS with FE.
S.e’s in brackets. Additional
regressors: remaining IVs
(predetermined variables and
second lags of other covariates
reported in Table 8. * Significant
at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
[1] [2]
Dep. var: Rit Dep. Var = Rit ∗ twi,t−1
F1 0.024∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
[0.012] [0.010]
F2 0.028∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.008]
F3 −0.013∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.009]
F1c,t−1 0.083∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
[0.032] [0.124]
F2c,t−1 0.080∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
[0.031] [0.124]
F3c,t−1 −0.045∗∗ 0.342∗∗
[0.022] [0.074]
No. obs. 15792 15792
Partial R-squared 0.34 0.38
Fig. 3 Conversion rates before and after 1994, 1997 and 2002 EPL reforms
there was no change in EPL regulations. As can be inspected, the observations are
neither above the 45 degree line (as in the first two reforms) nor below it (as in the last
reform).20
20 Though not reported in Table 6, the corresponding interaction tem for this placebo reform is highly
insignificant in the firt-stage regressions.
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Fig. 4 Conversion rates before
and after 1999 when there was
no reform
5.3 Empirical results
Table 7 reports results for the regression model in (5.1). First, as a benchmark for the
Sys-GMM estimates, column [1] reports Within-group estimates. Secondly, column
[2] presents the Sys-GMM results using the weighting matrix discussed in Blundell
and Bond (1998). To test for the validity of the overall overidentifying restrictions
we use a Sargan test statistic based on the minimized value of the GMM criterion
for the Sys-GMM estimator. Moreover, since the moment condition used in the first-
differenced restrictions are a subset of those used by Sys-GMM, we also report a
Difference (Dif) Sargan test based on the difference between the two standard Sargan
tests (one for Sys-GMM and another for GMM in first differences) as a more specific
check for the validity of these extra moment conditions. We report the p-values of
obtained for these tests, which have chi-squared asymptotic distributions. Finally, p-
values of m1 and m2 tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N (0, 1), are also reported at
the bottom of Table 7. As can be observed, neither the Sargan test nor the Dif-Sargan
test reject the overall and extra overidentifying restrictions at the 10% level, pointing
out that the mean-stationarity assumption required for consistency of the Sys-GMM
approach is not rejected.21 In addition, the rejection outcome of the m1 test and the
non-rejection of the m2 test jointly indicate that the the (level) disturbance term in
(5.1) is not serially correlated, so that the chosen lag lengths for IVs are seemingly
correct.
The main findings in Table 7 estimates are as follows. First, the within-group esti-
mated coefficients on the conversion rate and its interaction with the lagged share of
temporary work are larger than the corresponding Sys-GMM estimates. This result
indicates that the within-group estimates of the coefficients of interest are likely to be
upward biased since they are also capturing the reverse causality going from higher
TFP to higher conversion rates. Second, as expected, persistence is lower under Sys-
GMM. Third, the estimated SYS-GMMcoefficients on Rit and Rit ∗twi,t−1 in column
[2] are positive and statistically significant: 0.062 (t-ratio: 2.24) and 0.064 (t-ratio:
21 Although not reported in Table 7, in column (2) we also added twi,t as an additional covariate in
z to check if the share of temporary work directly affects firms’ TFP, beyond its indirect effect through
conversion rates. Besides the other IVs, the FS dummies and the cell-level interaction terms provide the
two IVs required to instrument R and twi,t in the first stage. The resulting estimated coefficient on the
latter in the second stage was −0.005 (t-ratio= 0.83), confirming that this share on its own is not relevant
to explain firms’ TFP.
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Table 7 Within-groups and
Sys-GMM estimates of
determinants of firms’ TFP
The dependent variable in the
two columns is (logged) TFP at
the firm level. S.e’s in brackets.
Estimation method:
Within-groups in [1] and Sys-
GMM in [2] . Additional
covariates: Size, Year, Industry
trends, Incorporated company,
Entry, Exit, Merger and Scission
dummies; Column [2] reports
results using the three reform
dumies and their interaction with
the lagged share of temporary
work at the cell level as the main
IVs. Addditional IVs are lags of
all the covariates (except age and
its square and size which are
considered as predetermined)
dated at t − 2 and further) in the
first-differenced equations and
first differences of the covariates
dated at t − 1 in the levels
equations
Variables [1] [2]
Within- groups SYS-GMM (cells)
Dep. variable: (logged TFP)
Conversion rate in t 0.109∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.028]
Conversion rate in t∗Temp
share in t − 1
0.102∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
[0.022] [0.026]
(logged) TFP in t − 1 0.384∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
[0.058] [0.063]
Prop. of workers with college
degree in t − 1
0.032∗∗ 0.046∗∗
[0.016] [0.022]
R&D Expenditure (logged)
in t − 1
0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001]
Proportion of public capital in
t − 1
0.005 0.004
[0.005] [0.004]
Proportion of foreign capital
in t − 1
0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.005]
Age 0.026 0.024
[0.019] [0.015]
Age Sq. −0.001 −0.001
[0.003] [0.003]
No. obs. 15792 15792
Sargan test (p-value) 0.237
Dif-Sargan test (p-value) 0.123
m1 Test (p-value) 0.034
m2 Test (p-value) 0.404
2.48), respectively. This is in line with our theoretical prediction on the relationship
between TFP and conversion rates. For example, according to these estimates, a rise
of 10 pp. in the conversion rate leads TFP to increase by 0.65 pp. in TFP in firms
where the share of temporary workers is 5%, while the rise in TFP reaches 0.81 pp.
in firms where that share reaches 30%.
Recall that the previous interpretation of the results exclusively in terms of the
responses of temporary workers to changes in the EPL gap only holds under on the
assumption that permanent workers hardly change their effort/training following such
changes in F. As argued earlier, this assumption seems plausible due to the non-
retroactive nature of the EPL reforms for this type of workers. Yet, it could be argued
that this might not be the case if a currently employed worker under a PC is sufficiently
forward looking to anticipate that, in case of being dismissed, the new regulation will
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applywhen starting anewemployment spell. Thismight affect both their effort/training
and the total surplus of ongoing permanentmatches. Hence, the variation in TFPwhich
was previously attributed to changes in the behaviour of temporary workers could also
be due to changes in the behaviour of permanent workers. To assess how relevant is
this possibility, we run similar Sys-GMM regressions as in column [2] of Table 7 using
this time three different subsamples of firms defined by the terciles of the distribution
of their (average) share of temporary work (tw). The first subsample corresponds to
the top tercile (firm with tw > 38.6%), the second subsample to the middle decile
(14.3.%< tw <38.6%) and third subsample to the bottom decile (tw <14.3%). If our
mechanism based on temporary workers’ reactions is relevant, we should expect the
estimates of the impact of F on a˜, via R, to be declining across these subsamples. This
is so since temporary work in the first subsample of firms is relatively more abundant
(i.e., they exhibit a higher share of TC) than in the second subsample, and the same
argument applies to a comparison of the second and third subsamples. Conversely, if
permanent workers were to respond to changes in F in an opposite way to temporary
workers, we should observe stable or increasing estimates across the three subsamples
since, for example, firms in the third subsample have a higher share of PC than in the
second subsample, and so on.
Table 8 presents the results of this exercise. Overall, we can observe a declining
pattern in the coefficients on Rit and Rit ×twc,−1 across the three subsamples. Yet, the
main finding is that they are fairly similar to those reported in Table 7.We interpret this
last result as supporting our interpretation that, at least on impact, most of the reaction
of TFP to changes in dual EPL stems from the response of temporary workers.
To gauge how important is the estimated effect of R on TFP, let us take at face
value the previous point estimate of 0.077 in column [2] (= 0.062 + 0.064 × 0.23,
evaluating the temporary work share in Rit × twi,t−1 at is average value of 23%).
Then, we compute the fraction of the slowdown in TFP growth during 1992–2005
(from 1.52% in 1992 to −0.17% in 2005, that is a decrease of 1.67 pp.) which is due,
ceteris paribus, to the fall in the conversion rate (from 12.2% in 1992 to 10.3 in 2005,
that is, a decrease of 1.9 pp.). Once the dynamic effects of the AR(1) in (5.1) are
accounted for, the observed decline in conversion rates explains 0.21 pp. of the 1.67
pp. reduction in TFP growth, namely about 13 percent. Admittedly, this is not a very
large effect, since we keep constant all the remaining determinants of TFP, but it is
relevant given that temporary workers represent less than one-fourth of all employees
in our dataset.
Finally, a pending important issue to address is the explanation of the simultaneous
decline in TFP and conversion rates between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s (see
Fig. 1 above). Since the only reform during that period which induced a one and for
all increase in F was the 2002 one and there are no other reforms increasing F until
2005, our mechanism is not able to explain the decline in TFP growth over that period.
Our conjecture is that this reduction has to do with the surge of a housing bubble in
Spain and its indirect effect on those manufacturing industries providing inputs to the
real estate sector.
To check this interpretation, we report in Table 9 the estimated coefficients on
the interaction term ηI t for the 18 industries considered in EESE, together with the
change in TFP growth in those sectors between 2000–2005 and 1995–2000, and their
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Table 8 Sys-GMM (cell) estimates of determinants of firms’ TFP (terciles of Temp-rates)
Variables [1] [2] [3]
T-rate > 38.6% 14.3% < T-rate< 38.6% T-rate < 14.3%
Conversion rate in t 0.073∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
[0.031] [0.032] [0.030]
Conversion rate in t∗Temp
share in t − 1
0.067∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
[0.030] [0.029] [0.031]
(logged) TFP in t − 1 0.274∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
[0.081] [0.079] [0.087]
Prop. of workers with college
degree in t − 1
0.031∗ 0.038∗ 0.043∗∗
[0.018] [0.020] [0.019]
R&D expenditure (logged) in
t − 1
0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Proportion of public capital in
t − 1
0.008 0.005 0.003
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Proportion of foreign capital
in t − 1
0.010∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Age 0.023 0.028 0.029∗
[0.021] [0.019] [0.015]
Age Sq. −0.003 −0.001 −0.002
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003]
No. obs. 5264 5264 5264
Sargan test (p-value) 0.213 0.262 0.188
Dif-Sargan test (p-value) 0.137 0.106 0.156
m1 test (p-value) 0.032 0.022 0.034
m2 test (p-value) 0.243 0.382 0.404
The dependent variable in the three columns is (logged) TFP at the firm level. S.e’ s in brackets. Estimation
method: Sys-GMM [2]. Additional covariates: size, year, industry trends, entry, exit, incorporated company,
merger and scission dummies; As in Column [2] of Table 7, the IVs used in Sys-GMM are the levels of
the covariates (except size, age and its square) dated in t − 2 in the first-differenced equations, and first
differences of those variables dated in t − 1 in the levels equations, in addition to the three reform dummies
and their interactions with the lagged share of temporary work at the cell level
share of temporary workers in 1998 (at the onset of the real estate boom). As can be
observed, the estimated slopes are negative and significant in most of the industries
which experienced a decline in TFP growth and had initially higher rates of tempo-
rary work. Interestingly, most of these industries- e.g., Basic Metals and Fabricated
Products, Plastic and Rubber Products, Textiles and Apparel, etc.- are ancillary to the
construction sector. This sector experienced a boom since the early 2000s as a result
of the large reduction in real interest rates which Spain enjoyed after joining the euro
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Table 9 Sys-GMM estimates of industry trend slopes
Industry Coeff Change Share
ηI t TFP growth (%) Temp. work (%)
Ferric and non ferric metals −0.012∗∗∗ −4.64 15.3
Non metallic mineral
products
−0.008∗∗ 2.78 15.8
Chemical products 0.011∗∗∗ 0.12 16.2
Metallic products 0.008∗∗ 0.09 12.3
Agricultural and industrial
machinery
0.003 0.26 15.6
Office machinery, data
processing machinery, etc.
0.009∗∗ −1.93 19.7
Electrical material and
electrical accessories
0.011∗∗ 0.25 21.3
Vehicles and motors 0.019∗∗∗ 1.12 18.7
Other transport material 0.014∗∗∗ 0.23 21.2
Meat and meat products 0.004 −0.32 27.2
Food and tobacco 0.008∗∗ 0.11 28.6
Beverages 0.010∗∗∗ 0.07 30.3
Textiles and apparels −0.021∗∗∗ −7.40 31.3
Leather products and shoes −0.013∗∗∗ −0.32 28.5
Wood and furniture 0.08∗ 0.85 23.6
Paper, paper products and
printing products
−0.012∗∗∗ −4.33 26.4
Plastic products and rubber −0.021∗∗∗ −4.72 30.3
Other manufactured products 0.010∗∗∗ 0.10 15.6
As in Table 7. The reported estimates correspond to the regression model shown in column [2] of Table 7.
Change in TFP growth between periods 1998–2000 and 2000–2005. Share of temporary work refers to
1998. Source: ESEE
area. As argued by Bentolila et al. (2012), investors in Spain partly bet rationally for
low-value added industries rather than high value-added ones (like ITs) because the
rigid PCwould have been inadequate to specialize inmore innovative industries which
require higher labor flexibility to accommodate the higher degree of uncertainty typ-
ically associated with producing high value-added goods (Saint-Paul 1997).22 Thus,
they specialized in sectors where flexible TCs could be amply used. Although more
research is due on this issue, this last piece of evidence seemingly points out that dual
EPL may not only have had detrimental effects on firms’ TFP but also affected firms’
specialization patterns, leading to misallocation of resources, as recently stressed by
Garcia-Santana et al. (2015).
22 See Beaudry et al. (2010) for a somewhat related analysis of the adoption of IT in US cities.
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5.3.1 Some evidence on training for permanent workers
Finally, we provide some further evidence as regards our interpretation of the results in
Table 7 in terms of temporary workers’ responses to changes in the EPL gap. Lacking
direct measures of workers’ effort, we focus exclusively on available information
about differences in training incidence by type of worker in the Spanishmanufacturing
sector, which can be drawn from the eight available annual waves (1994–2001) of the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP).23
On the basis of the training question “Have you at any time since January (in the
previous year) been in training, including part-time or short courses?”, we define
training incidence to take the value 1 if the employee received any such training, and
0 otherwise. Our sample contains 2,187 workers, out of which 1,743 hold PC and 444
TC, with an average incidence of training of 14.2% and a share of temporary work of
20.3%, fairly similar to the one in our firm-level dataset. We estimate a static random-
effects (RE) probit model for the observed binary dependent variable conditional on a
wide set of covariates regarding individuals’ and their firms’ characteristics measured
at the wave prior to the year where the training information was elicited.
Our main interest lies in examining how differences in training incidence between
permanent and temporary workers (reference category) have changed after the imple-
mentation of the 1997 EPL reform, which is the only one included in the available
sample period. To do so, besides including an indicator variable for holding a PC
among the set of controls, we add an interaction between this indicator and a step
dummy variable taking the value 1 from 1999 to 2001.24 In line with the notation used
earlier, we label this step dummy as F2.
Table 10 (column [1]) reports reduced-form marginal effects of holding a PC con-
tract and its interactionwith F2 onworker’s training incidence.25 As expected, we find
that permanent workers enjoy a higher training probability than temporary workers
(i.e., a positive marginal effect of PC in first row) and that this gap went down signifi-
cantly after the implementation of the 1997 reform (i.e., a negative marginal effect of
the interaction term the second row). Since this reform reduced the strictness of EPL
for (new) permanent workers and introduced a compensation for TC termination, the
drop in the training-incidence gap could be due to a lower provision of training for
permanent workers and/or to a higher provision of training for temporary workers.
To dig deeper into this issue, we run separate probit models for the subsamples of
permanent and temporary workers, and examine the marginal effect of the F2 indica-
tor. As reported in columns [2] and [3] of Table 10, we find that this marginal effect
is small and statistically insignificant for permanent workers, while it is positive and
statistically significant (at the 10% level) for temporary workers. Thus, this admittedly
23 To avoid confounding work-related training with formal vocational training education, our selected
subsample of the ECHP includes individuals aged between 25 and 54 who work at least 15 h per week in
the manufacturing sector and who are observed in at least two consecutive waves.
24 Recall that training incidence reported in the 1999 ECHP wave refers to training received in 1998,
which corresponds to the year after the implementation of the EPL reform considered here.
25 Notice that year dummies are also included and that the estimated ρ in Table 6 is the share of the
variance explained by unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 10 Random effects
training probit—marginal effects
The dependent variable is
training incidence (binary)
among workers aged 15–24,
working at least 15 hours in the
manufacturing sector.
Estimation by random effect
(RE) probit. S.e’s in brackets.
Additional controls are dummies
for age, gender, married or
cohabiting, presence of children
under 12, education level, firm
size, occupation, region, industry
and year dummies. * Significant
at 10% , ** at 5% , *** at 1%
Variable [1] [2] [3]
Whole PC TC
Sample Subsample Subsample
Permanent contract 0.036∗∗∗
[0.009]
F2∗ Permanent contract −0.009∗∗
[0.004]
F2 0.008∗∗ −0.003 0.010∗∗
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Estimated ρ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
No. obs. 2187 1743 444
Partial R-squared 0.44 0.38 0.26
partial evidence seems to validate our previous interpretation of the 1997 reform as one
where the EPL gap went down, leading to higher training incidence among temporary
workers and no significant change among permanent workers.
6 Conclusions
Since the early 1990s, Spain has been one the European countries with the highest
proportion of temporary work, doubling the average share in the EU-15. In parallel,
it has undergone a drastic productivity slowdown since the mid-1990s. In this paper
we analyze one of the mechanisms that could explain both stylized features, as well
as provide some empirical evidence about its relevance using an unbalanced panel
of Spanish manufacturing firms from 1991 to 2005. We build a simple model of a
dual labour market, with a large firing-costs gap between permanent and temporary
workers. The latter choose their level of effort in order to maximize expected utility
while firms choose their temp-to-perm conversion rates and paid-for-training for these
workers in order to maximize profits. The main implication is that, under plausible
conditions, changes in dual EPL lead to changes in conversion rates which in turn
affect the level of effort exerted by temporary workers and the amount of training they
receive from firms. Since workers’ effort and training can be thought of as components
of TFP, this mechanism provides a channel through which dual EPL could affect TFP.
Our empirical findings imply that, all else equal, up to 13% of the slowdown of
TFP growth in Spanish manufacturing firms could be due to how temporary workers
reacted to the reduction in conversion rates over our sample period. Since theseworkers
represent about 23% of employees this contribution is relevant. In addition, dual EPL
also seems to have had an effect on specialization patterns since the late 1990s. In
particular, it seems to have had negative spillover effects uponTFP in several industries
which were ancillary to the construction sector.
One shortcoming of our empirical approach is the lack of direct information on
workers’ effort and firms’ paid-for training, both embedded in our measure of TFP.
Yet, even in the absence of direct information on these variables, the results reported
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in this paper shed some light on how excessively dual EPL in two-tier labour markets
may have detrimental effects on firms’ productivity.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the concavity condition
Differentiation of (3.9) w.r.t. eT yields
∂2T
∂e2T
= (1 − γT )[ f ′′(eT ) − φ] + γT
[
2φ − α f ′′(eT )
]
D/λ,
where the first tem in its LHS is negative and the second term is positive, so that the
overall sign is ambiguous. To look for conditions under which it is negative (i.e. the
s.o.c. is satisfied for an interior solution), let us multiply the previous expression by
eT and subtract from it the f.o.c. (3.9). Since the subtrahend is zero, the sign of this
algebraic operation just coincides with the sign of ∂
2T
∂e2T
. In particular, under the CD
specification for f (eT ), this operation yields,
∂2T
∂e2T
= −(2 − α) f ′(eT )
[
1 − γT
(
1 + α
λ
D
)]
.
Since α < 1, ∂
2T
∂e2T
becomes negative whenever the bracketted term is positive, that
is,
γT
[
1 + α
λ
D
]
< 1,
which is the condition given in (3.10).
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Appendix B: Levinsohn and Petrin’ s (2003) approach
In what follows we briefly review the details of LP’s (2003) procedure to estimate the
(logged) production function,
yit = αL(ln LT,i t + ϑ ln LP,i t ) + φt (mit , kit ) + υi t ,
where φt (mit , kit ) = α0+αkkit +αmmit +ωt (mit , kit ). This equation is estimated by
NLS in the first stage, using a third-order polynomial inmit and kit with constant slopes
over time. The estimates α̂L and ϑ̂ will consistently identify the labour elasticity α and
the substitution parameter ϑ . Next, following Olley and Pakes (1996), it is assumed
that ωi t follows a first-order Markov process, leading to ωi t = g(ωi t−1). Although
g(·) has been specifically chosen to be a fourth-order polynomial in our empirical
implementation, we will consider a simple AR(1) process ωi t = ρωi t−1 + εi t , where
εi t is i.i.d., to briefly illustrate the second stage of the procedure yielding the remaining
input elasticities. By defining y˜i t = yit − α̂L(ln LT,i t + ϑ̂ ln LP,i t ) and taking into
account that ωi t−1 = ωt−1(mit−1, kit−1), it holds that,
y˜i t = α∗0 + αkkit + αmmit
+ ρ[φt−1(mit−1, kit−1) − αkkit−1 − αmmit−1] + υi t + εi t .
This is the equation estimated byNLS in the second stage, using the predicted values
for y˜i t and φt−1(mit−1, kit−1) obtained from the first-stage estimation. As LP (2003)
have shown, this second stage yields consistent estimates of αk and αm . Notice that,
since the predicted values have been used for y˜i t and φt−1(., .), the standard errors
of the estimated coefficients in the second stage should be corrected by bootstrap.
We implement this procedure separately for each of the 18 manufacturing industries
available in our dataset.
Appendix C: Data and definition of variables
Sample selection rules
We follow five rules for dropping firms or observations, namely, we exclude those
firms that: (i) change from one industry to another because their TFP in different
moments of time is not comparable; (ii) report observations with negative value added
or negative intermediate consumption or with ratios of labour cost to sales or material
cost to sales larger than unity; (iii) report an incomplete exercise in a year different than
the one in which it leaves the market; and finally (iv) do not report all the information
required to compute TFP or only providesthat information for a single year.
Variable definitions
• Output Value of the produced goods and services computed as sales plus the
variation of inventories deflated by the firm’s price index of output.
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• Permanent workers Workers hired under an indefinite contract until December
31st of each year.
• Temporary workers Workers hired under a fixed-term contract until December
31st. of each year.
• Conversions from temporary to permanent contractsNumber ofworkers promoted
to an indefinite contract who had a temporary contract at the same firm before
December 31st. of the previous year.
• Total effective worked hoursComputed as the number of workers times the average
hours per worker. The average hours per worker is computed as the normal hours
plus average overtime minus average working time lost at the workplace.
• Materials Value of intermediate consumption deflated by the firm’s price index of
materials.
• Capital Capital at current replacement values is computed recursively from an
initial estimate and the data on current investments in equipment goods (but
not buildings or financial assets) applying the recursive formula, Kit = (1 −
d) PI tPI,t−1 Ki,t−1 + Ii,t , where d is an industry-specific rate of depreciation and PI t
a price index of investment in equipment goods. Real capital is obtained by deflat-
ing capital at current replacement values with the price index of investment in
equipment goods.
• Investment Value of current investment in equipment goods.
• Wages Firm’s hourly wage rate (total labour cost divided by effective total hours
of work) deflated by the firm’s price index of output.
• Capital usage cost Weighted sum of long term interest rate with banks and other
long term debt plus the industry-specific depreciation rate minus the investment
inflation rate.
• Index of human capital Proportion of workers with an engineering or other college
degrees.
• Age The age of the firm is the difference between the current year and the year of
birth declared by the firm.
• Size There categories. Firms with more than 200 employees (large firms) and firms
with less than 200 but more that 50 employees (medium size firms) and firms with
less than 50 employees (small firms).
• Industry Firms are classified in 18 industries. See Table 4.
• R & D investment Value of current investment in R& D.
• Expansive/Recessive Market Dummy variables that take value 1 when the firm
reports that its market is in expansion/recession and 0 otherwise.
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